The Cannes festival kicked off Wednesday and unlike the Oscars where the organizers frown upon anything to do with activism, this international gathering of film talent welcomes political controversy and strong opinions.
So it came as no surprise that French philosopher and celebrity intellectual figure Bernard-Henri Lévy decided to use the festival opening as a springboard for a petition denouncing the 'denial of the legal rights' of a filmmaker who has been kept in 'Kafkaesque isolation' and 'forbidden to see his comrades, his colleagues and, sometimes, his friends.'
Lévy managed to make a splash by getting a dozen directors whose films have been selected to compete at this year's Cannes festival -- including Swiss filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard, Olivier Assayas... -- to sign a petition in support of the long-suffering director.
I refer of course to... Roman Polanski.
What!? Not Jafar Panahi?
Shortly after the Islamic regime arrested world-renowned director Jafar Panahi in early March because he was preparing to make a movie about the post-election unrest, Cannes festival president Gilles Jacob announced that he would invite Panahi to the festival as a special guest. Then on April 15, after unveiling his film selection, Jacob declared that Panahi had been chosen as a member of the festival jury presided by Tim Burton.
On Tuesday, festival director Thierry Frémaux had piqued the attention of the media by saying that a special gesture would be made to Panahi during the opening ceremony the next day. It was also announced that a short film showing the Iranian filmmaker describing a previous arrest and interrogation would be screened on Thursday afternoon, during the official opening of the 'Un Certain Regard' section of the festival. By then Panahi would have been in prison for over 70 days.
It was the eve of the festival's opening day and everything was in place to focus media attention on the plight of one Iranian filmmaker who would represent all the victims of human rights violations in the Islamic Republic.
And that's when Bernard-Henri Lévy decided to bring his petition on behalf of Polanski to the attention of the world. His act was all the more perplexing because he has been a friend of the democracy movement in Iran and has participated in protest marches against the Islamic Republic.
Roman Polanski has been under house arrest in his chalet in the skiing resort of Gstaad, awaiting the Swiss judiciary's decision on an American extradition request. This is the Kafkaesque isolation to which Lévy refers.
Polanski fled the US in 1978 just before being sentenced in a case involving sexual assault on a 13-year-old girl. His defenders proclaim that Polanski has been unfairly singled out and that he should not be extradited because, among various reasons, a statute of limitations should apply, the victim no longer wants Polanski to be prosecuted, and the filmmaker has already served his sentence because he spent 42 days confined to Chino state prison for psychiatric evaluation.
I do not want to argue whether the case put forward by Polanski's advocates has any merit. I am not a lawyer and I do not know the details of the case.
But I do know that Lévy is an adroit manipulator of the media, in a good way I should add, since he has often highlighted legitimate human rights abuses around the globe. He knew exactly what he was doing with his latest effort. His goal was to have people mention Panahi and Polanski as victims in the same breath.
Tim Burton and the festival organizers' decision to include an empty chair bearing Panahi's name on the stage next to the other jury members at the opening ceremony was a fantastic coup which has been reported around the world:
However, it was also noteworthy that a journalist at the jury's press conference asked Burton about his thoughts on Panahi AND Polanski. 'All of us are for freedom of expression. We fight for that every day and in our lives,' responded the jury president, as vaguely as he could.
This didn't sit well with Lévy, who griped to a radio station Friday morning, 'When you're the president [sic] of the Cannes festival, when you have the opportunity to tell a comrade, whom you know very well is not a pedophile, when you have the opportunity to express your support to him and you just say, "I'm for freedom of expression," it's pathetic.' Lévy went on to describe Burton as an 'immense filmmaker and a mediocre individual.'
Maybe Burton wasn't playing along, but others were. In a piece published by Le Monde and entitled 'Free Panahi and Polanski,' columnist Franck Nouchi wrote, 'In Iran and the United States, for reasons which are certainly different, cinema is gagged in this manner.' Nouchi then went on to stretch his intellectual gymnastic act to breaking point by stating, 'If the liberation of Panahi and Polanski is blocked to this extent today, it is because they are victims of who they are: huge artists.'
However much the facts are stretched, there is no equivalence between the case of a filmmaker who may or may not have committed statutory rape over 30 years ago and the case of a prisoner of conscience who has undeniably been arrested because of his opposition to the Islamic regime and his desire to exercise freedom of expression.
And however much Polanski's friends and defenders decry his situation, his solitude and pain in a chalet in the Swiss Alps cannot be compared to that of Panahi, for years prevented by the Islamic Republic from making a new film and now held in a true prison.
This is not a tale of two dungeons.
Bernard-Henri Lévy should have known better.
Friday, May 14, 2010
Thursday, May 13, 2010
General strike in Kurdistan province
Footage and photos posted to the Internet appear to indicate that a general stike called in Kurdistan procince today, May 13, 2010, to protest the execution of five political prisoners, Farzad Kamangar, Shirin Alam Hooli, Ali Heidari, Mehdi Eslamian, and Farhad Vakili on Sunday -- four of them Iranian Kurds -- has been successful.
Purportedly Sanandaj
Cars purportedly honking to celebrate success of general strike.
Purportedly Mahabad
Purportedly Sanandaj
Cars purportedly honking to celebrate success of general strike.
Purportedly Mahabad
Endless line of cars waiting for gas
A video purporting to show an endless line of cars queuing for compressed natural gas in Tehran was posted on YouTube yesterday, but was allegedly filmed on May 9, 2010, around midnight.
In an effort to reduce gasoline consumption, the Islamic Republic has encouraged the production and sale of natural gas vehicles and bi-fuel vehicles which run on compressed natural gas (CNG). Consumers have bought such cars in order to overcome gasoline rationing and a significant hike in gasoline prices which is expected once the new subsidy law is implemented. It is also feared that new sanctions will severely restrict gasoline imports. Although Iran has some of the world's largest petroleum reserves, it depends on gasoline imports because of its failing refinery capacity. According to Deputy Oil Minister Azizollah Ramezani, there are about 1.5 million bi-fuel vehicles on the country's roads today.
Unfortunately for the owners of such vehicles, the Islamic Republic has not built enough CNG stations to service the automobiles. Only 900 such stations are currently operating in the country, according to Ramezani, who may be suspected of padding the figures. In an unusual show of candor, Fars News published a report, reprinted by the Iranian energy conservation association, in September 2009 about the long lines of cars outside CNG stations around the country. (As Fars News is close to the Revolutionary Guards, this report may have been part of a campaign by the IRGC to gain the national contract for building a chain of outlets. The Khatam ol-Anbia Reconstruction Base, the IRGC's main engineering company, and perhaps the largest such group in the country, is already involved in several massive oil and gas projects, including the South Pars Gas Fields.)
'Most owners of bi-fuel vehicles, which entered the market following the decision of the 9th government (NB Ahmadinejad's previous administration) to optimize and reduce energy consumption, continue to express dissatisfaction, mainly because they must waste a great deal of time in long lines in front of CNG stations,' wrote Fars News. The news agency's intrepid reporter wrote, 'Around 11 AM, we arrive at the CNG station in Kordestan Freeway and the first thing that attracts our attention is a long line of cars stretching for 500 to 600 meters.' Reza Somboli, the CNG station's manager, told Fars news that such numbers of vehicles can be witnessed around the clock and that it is only between 1AM and 5AM that the line grows a bit shorter. This particular station has 4 pumps with 8 nozzles, but only 4 nozzles are actually working. A motorist must wait 90 minutes on average to get from the end of the line to a gas pump, Somboli said.
The Fars News reporter witnessed the same problem at the Shahid Hakim CNG station (3 pumps) a bit farther away. The footage posted on YouTube purportedly shows the Shahid Hakim CNG station:
View Tehran - Hakim Compressed Natural Gas station, Hakim Freeway - 9 May 2010 in a larger map
A translation of the cameraman's comments follows the video:
Cameraman:
Hello, hello. So today was May 9, 2010. We were driving by, around midnight, and we saw a very interesting thing and we thought you should see it too. This car which you see parked sideways in a traffic circle is waiting in a nice line. Now this is where the queue starts.
Passenger:
What could this line be for?
[...]
Cameraman:
Please drive a bit faster, because at this rate we won't make it home.
What a nice line. I'm Parsa Kamranian and am one of your dear countrymen visiting from Dubai. I saw this scene and it was really fascinating for me.
[...]
What a line. Unbelievable.
Passenger:
Maybe Julia Roberts is at the end.
[...]
Cameraman:
Let me give a hint to our smart fellow citizens. We're near Kordestan [Freeway in Tehran]. Stop, stop the car. (They stop next to a motorist) Sir, what are you queuing for?
Motorist:
This line is for gas, my dear.
Cameraman:
Gas! So that's what it is.
[...]
(Another motorist confirms the line is for gas.)
And here we are. The Shahid Hakim CNG station.
In an effort to reduce gasoline consumption, the Islamic Republic has encouraged the production and sale of natural gas vehicles and bi-fuel vehicles which run on compressed natural gas (CNG). Consumers have bought such cars in order to overcome gasoline rationing and a significant hike in gasoline prices which is expected once the new subsidy law is implemented. It is also feared that new sanctions will severely restrict gasoline imports. Although Iran has some of the world's largest petroleum reserves, it depends on gasoline imports because of its failing refinery capacity. According to Deputy Oil Minister Azizollah Ramezani, there are about 1.5 million bi-fuel vehicles on the country's roads today.
Unfortunately for the owners of such vehicles, the Islamic Republic has not built enough CNG stations to service the automobiles. Only 900 such stations are currently operating in the country, according to Ramezani, who may be suspected of padding the figures. In an unusual show of candor, Fars News published a report, reprinted by the Iranian energy conservation association, in September 2009 about the long lines of cars outside CNG stations around the country. (As Fars News is close to the Revolutionary Guards, this report may have been part of a campaign by the IRGC to gain the national contract for building a chain of outlets. The Khatam ol-Anbia Reconstruction Base, the IRGC's main engineering company, and perhaps the largest such group in the country, is already involved in several massive oil and gas projects, including the South Pars Gas Fields.)
'Most owners of bi-fuel vehicles, which entered the market following the decision of the 9th government (NB Ahmadinejad's previous administration) to optimize and reduce energy consumption, continue to express dissatisfaction, mainly because they must waste a great deal of time in long lines in front of CNG stations,' wrote Fars News. The news agency's intrepid reporter wrote, 'Around 11 AM, we arrive at the CNG station in Kordestan Freeway and the first thing that attracts our attention is a long line of cars stretching for 500 to 600 meters.' Reza Somboli, the CNG station's manager, told Fars news that such numbers of vehicles can be witnessed around the clock and that it is only between 1AM and 5AM that the line grows a bit shorter. This particular station has 4 pumps with 8 nozzles, but only 4 nozzles are actually working. A motorist must wait 90 minutes on average to get from the end of the line to a gas pump, Somboli said.
The Fars News reporter witnessed the same problem at the Shahid Hakim CNG station (3 pumps) a bit farther away. The footage posted on YouTube purportedly shows the Shahid Hakim CNG station:
View Tehran - Hakim Compressed Natural Gas station, Hakim Freeway - 9 May 2010 in a larger map
A translation of the cameraman's comments follows the video:
Cameraman:
Hello, hello. So today was May 9, 2010. We were driving by, around midnight, and we saw a very interesting thing and we thought you should see it too. This car which you see parked sideways in a traffic circle is waiting in a nice line. Now this is where the queue starts.
Passenger:
What could this line be for?
[...]
Cameraman:
Please drive a bit faster, because at this rate we won't make it home.
What a nice line. I'm Parsa Kamranian and am one of your dear countrymen visiting from Dubai. I saw this scene and it was really fascinating for me.
[...]
What a line. Unbelievable.
Passenger:
Maybe Julia Roberts is at the end.
[...]
Cameraman:
Let me give a hint to our smart fellow citizens. We're near Kordestan [Freeway in Tehran]. Stop, stop the car. (They stop next to a motorist) Sir, what are you queuing for?
Motorist:
This line is for gas, my dear.
Cameraman:
Gas! So that's what it is.
[...]
(Another motorist confirms the line is for gas.)
And here we are. The Shahid Hakim CNG station.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Inflation down... but so are prospects
I was perusing the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook, released in April 2010, when a statistic jumped out at me. The rate of inflation in the Islamic Republic had fallen to 10.3% in 2009, from 25.4% the previous year.
What was going on? Had the Ahmadinejad administration shown more economic know-how than has been generally recognized? Most economists have faulted the government for runaway expenditure, low currency reserves, a moribund manufacturing base, a skewed balance of trade (especially if oil exports are taken out of the equation), rising unemployment...
I sought the opinion of two Iranian economists who wish to remain anonymous. They had, of course, already seen the figures and were not particularly surprised.
Falling inflation in a booming environment is a sign of good stewardship, but it can also be the by-product of an economic slowdown. In other words, less activity translates into less purchasing power which puts pressure on the prices of goods. In the case of the Islamic Republic, the rate of inflation is also subject to the massive import of cheap goods (a policy of the Ahmadinejad government, by the way), especially from China. While the price of meat may have risen drastically to 12,000 to 13,000 toumans a kilo, milk to 350 toumans a liter, potatoes to 1,000 toumans a kilo (and the list goes on), the basket of goods and services which is used to calculate the rate of inflation also includes cheaper shoes, cheaper cars, cheaper textiles, cheaper television sets, and so on, from China. This may push down the rate of inflation, but it also has a devastating effect on the manufacturing sector, which will lead to a greater economic downturn in the future. The appearance of imported fruit and vegetables in Iranian markets also paints a gloomy forecast for the country's agriculture.
Emerging countries in the region saw a similar fall in average inflation -- 13.5% to 6.6% -- in 2008 and 2009. However, the Islamic Republic's rate -- 25.4% down to 10.3% -- was still much higher than the average, while some countries even showed deflationary tendencies. The price of a basket of some 350 goods and services had actually fallen (a negative rate of inflation) by 2.8% in Iraq and 4.9% in Qatar over the same period.
A look at the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Islamic Republic provides part of the explanation. In 2008, the economy grew an unimpressive 2.3%, which is still better than last year's disastrous 1.8%. In comparison, the average growth for the region's emerging countries during those two years was 5.1% and 2.4%. Iraq's growth rate was 9.5% and 4.2%, while Qatar's economy surged 15.8% and 9% in the same period. Kuwait had a 6.4% increase in GDP in 2008, but its economy actually contracted by -2.7% last year. However, no one is exactly weeping for Kuwait because it is one of the richest countries in the world when it comes to GDP per capita (estimated by the IMF at over $31,482 per Kuwaiti citizen last year. The Islamic Republic's GDP per capita is estimated to have been $4,460 last year).
Economic growth also has an effect on employment, or to be more precise unemployment in the case of the Islamic Republic. 800,000 new workers enter the country's labor force every year, which means that more than 800,000 jobs must be created annually to chip away at the unemployment rate. This rate is pretty much a mystery. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly advanced a figure of about 11%, whether economic growth has been high or low, which suggests some creative accounting. Most economists estimate the rate is closer to 25% of the labor force, and as high as 34% when it comes to young people. Reza Rahimi Nassab, Majlis representative and member of the legislature's social committee, recently said that the unemployment rate in Lorestan province had reached 40%.
The government's optimistic 4th economic plan called for the creation of 1.2 million jobs last year and it is highly unlikely that figure has been reached. The same plan was supposed to bring about an 8% rise in GDP (actual figure: 1.8%) and reduce unemployment to 8%. The Majlis is currently debating whether the 4th economic plan should continue to be implemented, or whether the country should embark on the 5th economic plan in the middle of this Iranian calendar year.
Economists believe that the Islamic Republic must maintain economic growth of 7% to 8% in order to stabilize the unemployment rate, and that its GDP must increase by 9% to 10% to begin to put a significant dent in the unemployment figures. Unfortunately for the legions of young people entering the market, the IMF predicts that the Islamic Republic's economy will grow by no more than 3% annually over the next three years.
As a futile exercise in going down memory lane, I took a look at GDP per capita in Iran and several other countries in 1978, at the time of the revolution, and 30 years later. I present the stark figures below (These are World Bank statistics, not adjusted for inflation, and converted to US dollars applying market exchange rates, which explains the difference with the IMF's numbers). Conclude what you will...
Iran $1,997 $4,027 (2007)
Malaysia $1,238 $8,209
Hungary $1,552 $15,408
Mexico $1,595 $10,231
Oman $2,566 $15,272 (2007)
France $9,193 $44,507
UK $5,785 $43,541
Saudi Arabia $9,373 $19,021
Spain $4,239 $35,214
What was going on? Had the Ahmadinejad administration shown more economic know-how than has been generally recognized? Most economists have faulted the government for runaway expenditure, low currency reserves, a moribund manufacturing base, a skewed balance of trade (especially if oil exports are taken out of the equation), rising unemployment...
I sought the opinion of two Iranian economists who wish to remain anonymous. They had, of course, already seen the figures and were not particularly surprised.
Falling inflation in a booming environment is a sign of good stewardship, but it can also be the by-product of an economic slowdown. In other words, less activity translates into less purchasing power which puts pressure on the prices of goods. In the case of the Islamic Republic, the rate of inflation is also subject to the massive import of cheap goods (a policy of the Ahmadinejad government, by the way), especially from China. While the price of meat may have risen drastically to 12,000 to 13,000 toumans a kilo, milk to 350 toumans a liter, potatoes to 1,000 toumans a kilo (and the list goes on), the basket of goods and services which is used to calculate the rate of inflation also includes cheaper shoes, cheaper cars, cheaper textiles, cheaper television sets, and so on, from China. This may push down the rate of inflation, but it also has a devastating effect on the manufacturing sector, which will lead to a greater economic downturn in the future. The appearance of imported fruit and vegetables in Iranian markets also paints a gloomy forecast for the country's agriculture.
Emerging countries in the region saw a similar fall in average inflation -- 13.5% to 6.6% -- in 2008 and 2009. However, the Islamic Republic's rate -- 25.4% down to 10.3% -- was still much higher than the average, while some countries even showed deflationary tendencies. The price of a basket of some 350 goods and services had actually fallen (a negative rate of inflation) by 2.8% in Iraq and 4.9% in Qatar over the same period.
A look at the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Islamic Republic provides part of the explanation. In 2008, the economy grew an unimpressive 2.3%, which is still better than last year's disastrous 1.8%. In comparison, the average growth for the region's emerging countries during those two years was 5.1% and 2.4%. Iraq's growth rate was 9.5% and 4.2%, while Qatar's economy surged 15.8% and 9% in the same period. Kuwait had a 6.4% increase in GDP in 2008, but its economy actually contracted by -2.7% last year. However, no one is exactly weeping for Kuwait because it is one of the richest countries in the world when it comes to GDP per capita (estimated by the IMF at over $31,482 per Kuwaiti citizen last year. The Islamic Republic's GDP per capita is estimated to have been $4,460 last year).
Economic growth also has an effect on employment, or to be more precise unemployment in the case of the Islamic Republic. 800,000 new workers enter the country's labor force every year, which means that more than 800,000 jobs must be created annually to chip away at the unemployment rate. This rate is pretty much a mystery. The Islamic Republic has repeatedly advanced a figure of about 11%, whether economic growth has been high or low, which suggests some creative accounting. Most economists estimate the rate is closer to 25% of the labor force, and as high as 34% when it comes to young people. Reza Rahimi Nassab, Majlis representative and member of the legislature's social committee, recently said that the unemployment rate in Lorestan province had reached 40%.
The government's optimistic 4th economic plan called for the creation of 1.2 million jobs last year and it is highly unlikely that figure has been reached. The same plan was supposed to bring about an 8% rise in GDP (actual figure: 1.8%) and reduce unemployment to 8%. The Majlis is currently debating whether the 4th economic plan should continue to be implemented, or whether the country should embark on the 5th economic plan in the middle of this Iranian calendar year.
Economists believe that the Islamic Republic must maintain economic growth of 7% to 8% in order to stabilize the unemployment rate, and that its GDP must increase by 9% to 10% to begin to put a significant dent in the unemployment figures. Unfortunately for the legions of young people entering the market, the IMF predicts that the Islamic Republic's economy will grow by no more than 3% annually over the next three years.
Iran $1,997 $4,027 (2007)
Malaysia $1,238 $8,209
Hungary $1,552 $15,408
Mexico $1,595 $10,231
Oman $2,566 $15,272 (2007)
France $9,193 $44,507
UK $5,785 $43,541
Saudi Arabia $9,373 $19,021
Spain $4,239 $35,214
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Ahmadinejad the veteran?
My previous post concerning a photo of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi in the early 1980s provoked an exchange in the comments section between Mark Pyruz, who has a much better knowledge of Islamic Republic military issues than I, and a reader who remained anonymous:
I won't get into Ali Sayyad Shirazi's military career, which did indeed include senior commands during the Iran-Iraq War. He was assassinated outside his Tehran home in 1999 by members of the MKO who had disguised themselves as garbage collectors. He was at that time a brigadier general, I believe. (If I'm mistaken, I'm sure I will be corrected on this by Mark or another reader). Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mohammad Khatami attended his funeral.
The issue of Ahmadinejad's military career is a much murkier affair. The official web site of the presidency states, 'During the war imposed on Iran, Dr. Ahmadi Nejad was actively present as a member of the volunteer forces (Basij) in different parts and divisions of the battlefronts particularly in the war engineering division until the end of the war.' Rumors have circulated for years that Ahmadinejad has exaggerated his war record, but the dissenting voices have grown louder since the disputed election of June 12.
Towards the end of July 2009, conservative Tehran Mayor (and Ahmadinejad rival) Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf uttered some extremely harsh words about Ahmadinejad's management and policies: 'I don't consider Ahmadinejad a revolutionary or a member of the party of God or a follower of the Leader or a manager or honest. Mr. Ahmadinejad, with all his being, fools himself and then fools everyone else.' But more relevant to the issue of Ahmadinejad's military career, Ghalibaf, who fought in the Iran-Iraq War from an early age and was the commander of the Panj Nasr division by the time he was 22, said, 'Ahmadinejad does not have even one day's experience prior to the revolution, he did not receive even one slap for the cause of the revolution. If he did something, he should come and tell us where. Ahmadinejad did not see the war or the front. If he had been on the front for only one day, he would have boasted about it for a thousand days.'
More recently, on February 28, 2009, Mehdi Khazali, a medical doctor who owns a publishing house, wrote a scathing piece on his blog entitled 'Ahmadinejad's mischief in his biography.' Before getting to the blog post, a few words on Khazali and, perhaps more importantly, his father.
Mehdi Khazali is the son of Ayatollah Abolghassem Khazali, member of the Assembly of Experts since its inception, one of the authors of the final draft of the Islamic Republic's constitution (he claims that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did not want women to become president, which could be true), the head of the Ghadir Foundation (he famously called for the Muslim celebration of Ghadir to replace Now Rouz as the Iranian new year's day) and one of the most mealy-mouthed, blubbering, and Messianic supporters of Ahmadinejad to roam the land of Iran. Sorry to have lost my journalistic objectivity there for a second, but Ayatollah Khazali actually said that Ahmadinejad's election to his first term was supported by the Hidden Imam, or Messiah, of Shiites. In short, not exactly an unbiased observer when it comes to Ahmadinejad. The ayatollah's son, however, begs to differ.
Mehdi Khazali has been such a regular critic of the government that the Guardian Council disqualified him from running in the last legislative elections and he was prevented from being a candidate in the national medical organization's board elections. On June 29, 2009, Mehdi was arrested for participating in street protests and for slandering the president by claiming on his blog that Ahmadinejad has Jewish roots and that he was compensating by being zealously Muslim and anti-Israel. Mehdi was inexplicably tried by the Special Court of the Clergy and was released on bail a month later. In the mean time, his father had disowned him in a highly publicized statement.
Mehdi Khazali's short prison stay did not calm his ardor and he has been writing on his blog on an almost daily basis. Which brings us to his February 28 post.
'In the half-finished biography on his personal web site, Ahmadinejad has craftily mixed himself up with the warriors [of the Iran-Iraq War],' Mehdi Khazali began. 'I knew he had never been to the front, but out of caution, I asked the commander of the Revolutionary Guards during the Imposed War, brother Mohsen Rezai (NB One of the four presidential candidates on June 12 and not a great admirer of Ahmadinejad). He also confirmed the absence of the aforementioned on the battlefronts. Of course, the heads of the other two branches of government (NB Speaker Ali Larijani and his brother judiciary chief Sadegh Larijani) never saw the front either, but at least they do not make any pretenses about war and being warriors.'
He continued in his post, 'I remember the good old days, when I told my interrogator that the heads of the three branches had never been to the front, and that when we were fighting in the war, many others were jockeying for appointments and consolidating their positions. The interrogator responded, That's not a criteria! I told him, If the Iraqis had made it to Tehran and your honor had been in their hands, you would have understood whether its a criteria or not.'
Khazali later quoted from Ahmadinejad's personal web site, 'Read this paragraph from the biography of Mr. Ahmadinejad: At the beginning of the war, I was 25 years old. My mother and my wife, and all the mothers and wives whose children and husbands were defending their country on the fronts, were patiently raising a resistant, brave, and pious generation.' Khazali accuses Ahmadinejad of equivocation in this sentence in order to pretend that he was also fighting on the front.
Khazali then wrote in his deliciously irreverent style, 'Dear Haj Mahmoud, stop grandstanding. When were you on the front? Which division, which battalion, which area, which operation? No dear one, in those days you were again behind the lines, jockeying for position. Even afterwards, you ran Hashemi Rafsanjani's campaign in your neighborhood so you could get a job in Hashemi's government. You kissed the hands of the gentlemen so they would pat you on the back and... Come on, be yourself. Don't run after halos and battlefronts (NB The halo refers to Ahmadinejad's claim that a halo formed around his head as he was addressing the UN General Assembly in 2005.'
I've posted the photo purportedly showing Ahlmadinejad during the Iran-Iraq War and referred to by Mark Pyruz below. It should be pointed out that even if the person in the photo is Ahmadinejad, it does not clarify the question of whether he ever saw any combat or whether he spent the war years behind the lines:
Here are several shots of Ali Sayyad Shirazi, which my anonymous reader says is the person in the photograph above:
I'd be interested to know what the readers think and invite you contribute any additional information you may have on this issue.
Mark Pyruz: homy, have you seen this photo purportedly of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a soldier during Jange Tahmili (the Imposed War)?
http://img194.imageshack.us/img194/7725/208901210017l600.jpg
It would be interesting to know the dates of your student Ahmadinejad and this soldier Ahmadinejad, for purposes of authentication. (He's definitely older in the later.)
Anonymous: To Mark Pyruz,
It is not A.N. on that picture taken during the war. The man standing on the right side of the picture is colonel Sayyad Shirazi, perhaps the most famous army commander during the Iran Iraq war.
I won't get into Ali Sayyad Shirazi's military career, which did indeed include senior commands during the Iran-Iraq War. He was assassinated outside his Tehran home in 1999 by members of the MKO who had disguised themselves as garbage collectors. He was at that time a brigadier general, I believe. (If I'm mistaken, I'm sure I will be corrected on this by Mark or another reader). Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mohammad Khatami attended his funeral.
The issue of Ahmadinejad's military career is a much murkier affair. The official web site of the presidency states, 'During the war imposed on Iran, Dr. Ahmadi Nejad was actively present as a member of the volunteer forces (Basij) in different parts and divisions of the battlefronts particularly in the war engineering division until the end of the war.' Rumors have circulated for years that Ahmadinejad has exaggerated his war record, but the dissenting voices have grown louder since the disputed election of June 12.
Towards the end of July 2009, conservative Tehran Mayor (and Ahmadinejad rival) Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf uttered some extremely harsh words about Ahmadinejad's management and policies: 'I don't consider Ahmadinejad a revolutionary or a member of the party of God or a follower of the Leader or a manager or honest. Mr. Ahmadinejad, with all his being, fools himself and then fools everyone else.' But more relevant to the issue of Ahmadinejad's military career, Ghalibaf, who fought in the Iran-Iraq War from an early age and was the commander of the Panj Nasr division by the time he was 22, said, 'Ahmadinejad does not have even one day's experience prior to the revolution, he did not receive even one slap for the cause of the revolution. If he did something, he should come and tell us where. Ahmadinejad did not see the war or the front. If he had been on the front for only one day, he would have boasted about it for a thousand days.'
More recently, on February 28, 2009, Mehdi Khazali, a medical doctor who owns a publishing house, wrote a scathing piece on his blog entitled 'Ahmadinejad's mischief in his biography.' Before getting to the blog post, a few words on Khazali and, perhaps more importantly, his father.
Mehdi Khazali is the son of Ayatollah Abolghassem Khazali, member of the Assembly of Experts since its inception, one of the authors of the final draft of the Islamic Republic's constitution (he claims that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did not want women to become president, which could be true), the head of the Ghadir Foundation (he famously called for the Muslim celebration of Ghadir to replace Now Rouz as the Iranian new year's day) and one of the most mealy-mouthed, blubbering, and Messianic supporters of Ahmadinejad to roam the land of Iran. Sorry to have lost my journalistic objectivity there for a second, but Ayatollah Khazali actually said that Ahmadinejad's election to his first term was supported by the Hidden Imam, or Messiah, of Shiites. In short, not exactly an unbiased observer when it comes to Ahmadinejad. The ayatollah's son, however, begs to differ.
Mehdi Khazali has been such a regular critic of the government that the Guardian Council disqualified him from running in the last legislative elections and he was prevented from being a candidate in the national medical organization's board elections. On June 29, 2009, Mehdi was arrested for participating in street protests and for slandering the president by claiming on his blog that Ahmadinejad has Jewish roots and that he was compensating by being zealously Muslim and anti-Israel. Mehdi was inexplicably tried by the Special Court of the Clergy and was released on bail a month later. In the mean time, his father had disowned him in a highly publicized statement.
Mehdi Khazali's short prison stay did not calm his ardor and he has been writing on his blog on an almost daily basis. Which brings us to his February 28 post.
'In the half-finished biography on his personal web site, Ahmadinejad has craftily mixed himself up with the warriors [of the Iran-Iraq War],' Mehdi Khazali began. 'I knew he had never been to the front, but out of caution, I asked the commander of the Revolutionary Guards during the Imposed War, brother Mohsen Rezai (NB One of the four presidential candidates on June 12 and not a great admirer of Ahmadinejad). He also confirmed the absence of the aforementioned on the battlefronts. Of course, the heads of the other two branches of government (NB Speaker Ali Larijani and his brother judiciary chief Sadegh Larijani) never saw the front either, but at least they do not make any pretenses about war and being warriors.'
He continued in his post, 'I remember the good old days, when I told my interrogator that the heads of the three branches had never been to the front, and that when we were fighting in the war, many others were jockeying for appointments and consolidating their positions. The interrogator responded, That's not a criteria! I told him, If the Iraqis had made it to Tehran and your honor had been in their hands, you would have understood whether its a criteria or not.'
Khazali later quoted from Ahmadinejad's personal web site, 'Read this paragraph from the biography of Mr. Ahmadinejad: At the beginning of the war, I was 25 years old. My mother and my wife, and all the mothers and wives whose children and husbands were defending their country on the fronts, were patiently raising a resistant, brave, and pious generation.' Khazali accuses Ahmadinejad of equivocation in this sentence in order to pretend that he was also fighting on the front.
Khazali then wrote in his deliciously irreverent style, 'Dear Haj Mahmoud, stop grandstanding. When were you on the front? Which division, which battalion, which area, which operation? No dear one, in those days you were again behind the lines, jockeying for position. Even afterwards, you ran Hashemi Rafsanjani's campaign in your neighborhood so you could get a job in Hashemi's government. You kissed the hands of the gentlemen so they would pat you on the back and... Come on, be yourself. Don't run after halos and battlefronts (NB The halo refers to Ahmadinejad's claim that a halo formed around his head as he was addressing the UN General Assembly in 2005.'
I've posted the photo purportedly showing Ahlmadinejad during the Iran-Iraq War and referred to by Mark Pyruz below. It should be pointed out that even if the person in the photo is Ahmadinejad, it does not clarify the question of whether he ever saw any combat or whether he spent the war years behind the lines:
Here are several shots of Ali Sayyad Shirazi, which my anonymous reader says is the person in the photograph above:
I'd be interested to know what the readers think and invite you contribute any additional information you may have on this issue.
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